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NOTES
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FEDERAL TRUTH IN
LENDING ACT TO RENTAL PURCHASE CONTRACTS
Since its enactment by Congress in 1968, the Truth In Lend-
ing Act' has been an important, if controversial, attempt to pro-
tect consumers using credit.2  Requiring uniform disclosure of all
I Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 160 1-16 67 e (1976)).
2 Commentators vigorously debate the Act's impact on consumer credit transactions.
Supporters of the Act emphasize its beneficial effects. First, the percentage of consumers
aware of prevailing annual percentage rates (APR) for ordinary loans increased signific-
antly between 1969 and 1977. [1977] FRB Truth-In-Lending Ann. Rep. reprinted in [1978]
INVEST. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) app. A, at 21 [hereinafter cited as 1977 ANN. REP.]; Truth In
Lending Simplification and Reform Act: Hearings on S. 108 and S. 37 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) (statement of Senator
Proxmire) thereinafter cited as 1979 TIL SIMPLIFICATION HEARINGS]. Second, despite the
"inherent limitations" of the benefits of disclosure for "high risk" credit users, many of
whom lack firmal education, disclosure has made relatively well-educated and moderately
affluent consumers sufficiently aware of credit costs "to bring about effective rate (price)
competition ... in the general market." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE,
CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 177-78 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NCGF RE-
PORT]. Third, disclosure of the "fluctuating cost of closed end credit" to consumer credit
users enhances overall "economic stabilization" by enabling consumers to "observe and
react" to changing credit costs and adjust their uses of credit by taking into account APR
variations. Id. at 184. See 1977 ANN. REP., supra, at 23-24. See generally Garwood, A Look At
Truth In Lending-Five Years After, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 491 (1974).
Critics of the Act dispute these assertions and contend that Truth In Lending disclo-
sures have had a minimal effect on consumer behavior in credit transactions. See Kripke,
Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-11 (1969); Note, Truth
In Lending. The Impossible Dream, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 89 (1970); Note, The Impact of
Truth In Lending on Automobile Financing-An Empirical Study, 4 U. CALIF. D. L. REV. 179
(1971). They argue that disclosure has proved particularly ineffective for the low-income
consumer. See NCCF REPORT, supra, at 179; Harrison, The Consumer Credit System and the
Low-Income Consumer, 13 J. FAM. L. 1, 7 (1973-74) ("While the need for [disclosure] would
not be questioned, its effectiveness would appear to be somewhat diminished where the
lowest socio-economic groups are involved.") (citing D. CAPLOVITZ, DEBTORS IN DEFAULT
(1970)); Note, 'Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967). See also COMMIS-
SION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION 13 (1977) (asserting inade-
quacy of increases in consumer awareness of APRs) (citing Mandell, Consumer Perception of
Incurred Interest Rates: An Empirical Test of the Efficacy of Truth-In-Lending, 26 J. FINANCE
1143 (1971).
Both advocates and critics claim that independent studies evaluating the effectiveness
of the Truth In Lending Act support their positions. For example, after an extensive
reevaluation of several empirical studies, one commentator concludes that there is "consid-
erable evidence to support the contention of the critics of disclosure regulation[s] ... [that]
truth-in-lending, has had little impact on consumer purchasing behavior." Whitford, The
Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 400, 469. He
notes, however, that the benefits of truth in lending disclosure regulation "may marginally
exceed its costs." Id. at 435. The Act's impact is limited, Professor Whitford suggests, be-
cause retailers use inadequate methods to communicate disclosed information to consum-
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charges associated with the extension of consumer credit, the Act
seeks to promote informed consumer use of credit and price
competition in the consumer credit industry. Rental purchase con-
tracts, however, threaten to undercut the Act's effectiveness. By
dividing a lease into a series of short-term rental contracts with an
option to purchase, merchants exploit the Act's literal language
and evade the provisions regulating credit sales. The Federal Re-
serve Board, which is responsible for administering the Act,3
maintains that rental purchase contracts are beyond the scope of
the Act. Most courts have deferred to the Board's position. This
Note argues that both the Federal Reserve Board and the courts
construe the Truth In Lending Act too narrowly. Because they
are unlikely to abandon this restrictive construction, Congress
should amend the Act's definition of "credit sale" so that it unam-
biguously encompasses rental purchase contracts and subjects
them to the Truth In Lending Act's credit sale provisions.
I
THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
Prior to the enactment of the Truth In Lending Act, confu-
sion prevailed in the consumer credit field. 4 Creditors expressed
finance charge rates and total sales amounts in different, incom-
parable ways; 5 some, simply quoting monthly dollar payments,
ers. Id. at 469-70. Some commentators, however, challenge the methodology and interpre-
tations of empirical research. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, S. 108: THE
FRB's 1977 CONSUMER CREDIT SURVEY DOES NOT SUPPORT S. 108 OR You ASK A STUPID
QUESTION You GET A STUPID ANSWER (1979) (criticizing Federal Reserve Board's 1977 con-
sumer awareness survey), reprinted in 1979 TIL SIMPLIFICATION HEARINGS, supra, at 44-47.
a See note 36 and accompanying text infra.
See Truth In Lending-1967: Hearings on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institu-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1967) (state-
ment of Senator Douglas, chairman of the National Commission on Urban Affairs) [here-
inafter cited as 1967 SEN. TIL HEARINGS] Congressman Halpern noted that "[t]he loan
shark and the credit deceiver have always had the benefit of complexity and confusion." Id.
at 444. For an account of the development of the American consumer credit industry and
the movement towards requiring credit cost disclosure, see NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at
5-21. For a review of state consumer credit legislation schemes prior to the Truth In Lend-
ing Act, see Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response to Consumer-Credit Problems, 8 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 409 (1967); Jordan & Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer
Credit, 8 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 441, 441-49 (1967).
5 Creditors have employed several different methods of calculating finance charges. (1)
The "add-on" rate is an expression of the finance charge as a dollar amount per year,
calculated With respect to the unpaid balance at the outset. For example, the creditor might
have stated the charge on a four-year, $3,000 loan as "$6.00 per $100," indicating a total
charge of $720 ($180/yr. x 4 yrs). The APR on this loan would be 12.5%. See NCCF
1980]
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made no rate disclosures at all.6 Such inconsistent practices pre-
cluded consumers from comparison shopping for credit terms.7
As the credit industry expanded rapidly 8 and the number of per-
sonal bankruptcies increased,- the need for complete and uni-
form disclosure of credit information became pressing. Consum-
ers needed information to enable them to compare credit costs.
REPORT, supra note 2, at 169. (2) The "discount" rate expresses the periodic charge in
dollars per $100 of unpaid balance, and is calculated after deducting the entire credit fee
from the note's initial face amount. The APR on the "$6.00 per $100" charge in the above
example would be 19.5%. (3) The "monthly" rate states a monthly percentage calculated on
a defined balance. The APR, not compounded, would be 12 times the quoted figure. At a
monthly rate of 1.25%, for example, the APR would be 15%. Some retailers employ a
combination of rate charge methods. Such "fragmentation" involves separating the total
finance charge "so that part appeared as an add-on or discount rate and part as a flat fee
or extra charge." A retailer, for example, might charge "8 percent a year discount (to 18
months)" plus a predetermined fee of "8 percent on the first $600 of initial unpaid bal-
ance." A $500 loan for six months would result in a charge of $68.14, reflecting an APR
of 46.33%. Id. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, THE "TRUTH-IN-LENDING" BILL 2-3
(1967) [hereinafter cited as AEI LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS]; 113 CONG. REC. 18400 (1967)
(statement of Senator Proxmire).
' See NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 169.
7 Consumers' inability to shop comparatively for credit resulted from a lack of knowl-
edge about finance charges and interest rates. Before the Truth In Lending Act became
effective in 1969, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted a
survey to determine levels of consumer awareness of finance charges and interest rates on
their personal debts. Of the households surveyed, less than one-half of consumers with
appliance and furniture loans claimed to know the interest rates oi their debts. Consumers
with low incomes or low education levels were even less aware. Of respondents with annual
incomes under $5,000, more than three-fourths did not know the annual percentage rates
of interest on their loans. Of those with incomes under $5,000 claiming knowledge of their
interest rates, more than half unrealistically estimated the annual percentage rates on their
credit use to be 7% or less. See [1969] FRB Truth-In-Lending Ann. Rep. reprinted in [1970]
INV. CRDW. GUIDE (CCH) app. B, at 1-13 (CCH 1970). For a review of surveys documenting
the difficulties consumers faced in comparing finance charges, see NCCF REPORT, supra
note 2, at 170.
8 In 1945, the total consumer credit debt was $5.5 billion. By March 1967, consumers
owed $92.5 billion in short-term and immediate debt. See 113 CONG. REC. 18423 (1967)
(remarks of Senator Morse). In 1967, $73.6 billion represented installment credit held by
financial institutions and retail outlets. 53 FED. RES. BULL. 834 (1967). See also S. REP. No.
392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-6 (1967). According to the National Commission on Consumer
Finance, this extraordinary growth was a result of
rising discretionary income, the urbanization of the population, and the influx
of younger consumers into the market. A particularly important influence has
been the trend to home ownership and its accompanying shift to owned dura-
ble goods in substitution for purchased services. The growth of asset ownership
has also been stimulated by the increased number of women in the work force.
NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 21.
9 In the early 1960's, the rate of nonbusiness bankruptcies rose from 73 per 100,000
persons to 85 per 100,000. In 1967, nonbusiness bankruptcies reached a high of 98 per
100,000 population. In 1968, the rate dropped to 92 per 100,000, and declined again in
1969 to 85 per 100,000. See NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
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Few lenders, however, disclosed a simple annual percentage rate
for fear of suffering a competitive disadvantage.
Legislators recognized the need for reform to protect con-
sumers. Eight years after the introduction of the first legislation
requiring full disclosure of credit costs, 10 Congress enacted the
Truth In Lending Act as Title I of the 1968 Consumer Credit
Protection Act."1 The Act requires that prior to extending credit,
a lender must disclose information 12 that Congress has deemed
relevant to the particular type of credit transaction.' 3 These re-
10 See S. 2755, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 106 CONG. REC. 97 (1960). When Senator Douglas
introduced the bill-popularly known- as the "interest-rate labelling bill"-he remarked:
"This bill would require that [the consumer] be given, in writing, two vital pieces of infor-
mation: First, the-total amount of the finance charges he is contracting to pay; and, second,
the percentage that such an amount bears to the outstanding balance expressed in simple
annual interest." Id. The Subcommittee on Production and Stabilization of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, chaired by Senator Douglas, conducted hearings on
the bill and reported it to the full Committee, which took no action. The bill died upon
adjournment of the 86th Congress.
In succeeding years credit disclosure legislation received similar treatment. After Mas-
sachusetts' enactment of a truth in lending bill and pressure from the Johnson Administra-
tion for a similar federal enactment, the Senate in 1967 passed S. 5, adapted and derived
from Senator Douglas' 1960 proposal. See S. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REC.
18424 (1967). The House, which was also actively considering comprehensive consumer
protection legislation in 1967, see H.R. 11601, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Consumer
Credit Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967), deleted all language of
S. 5 after the enacting clause, inserted the text of the House bill, and returned it to the
Senate. On May 20, 1968, the Conference Committee accepted a compromise S. 5, which
Congress enacted into law nine days later. See CONF. COMM. REP. No. 1397, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1962, 2021. For the legislative
history of S. 5 and a synopsis of the major issues, see AEI LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS, supra
note 5, at 1-5, 8-44.
11 Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976)).
12 The Act requires, prior to extension of consumer credit, complete and conspicuous
disclosure of finance charges, expressed both in dollar amount and as an annual percen-
tage rate. 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1976). "Credit" means the right that a creditor gives a debtor
to incur debt and defer its payment. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (1976). The finance charge is the
sum of most charges payable by the debtor-whether the creditor imposes them directly or
indirectly-as an incident of credit extension. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1976). In addition to
these general requirements, the creditor must satisfy the disclosure requirements applicable
to his credit plan. See note 13 and accompanying text infra.
13 The Act divides credit plans into three categories: (1) open end credit plans, 15
U.S.C. § 1637 (1976); (2) sales not under open end credit plans, 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (1976);
and (3) consumer loans not under open end credit plans, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1976). An
open end or "revolving credit" plan allows a debtor to maintain an account with a creditor,
who may extend credit repeatedly. Under a closed end credit plan the creditor extends
credit in a single transaction. The debtor pays the total debt over a fixed period of time.
See Davis, Protecting Consumers From Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the
Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841, 845 n. 17 (1977).
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quirements vary, but generally include disclosure of the amount
financed, the finance charge, the annual percentage rate, time-
sale price and time balance, prepayment procedures, rebates, de-
linquency charges, and any security interests.14 Because certain
requirements apply only to "credit sales", the Act's definition of
"credit sale" significantly restricts the scope of the statute.
Section 103 (g) of the Truth In Lending Act defines a "credit
sale" as:
any sale with respect to which credit is extended or arranged by
the seller. The term includes any contract in the form of a
bailment or lease if the bailee or lessee contracts to pay as com-
pensation for use a sum substantially equivalent to or in excess
of the aggregate value of the property and services involved
and it is agreed that the bailee or lessee will become, or for no
other or a nominal consideration has the option to become, the
owner of the property upon full compliance with his obligations
under the contract. 1 5
Thus, any lease is a credit sale if the lessee: (1) "contracts to pay"
a sum substantially equivalent to, or in excess of, the aggregate
value of the lease-property, and (2) has the option to purchase the
property for no more than a nominal sum.'"
Congress believed that more knowledgeable use of credit
would promote economic stability and competition within the
credit industry.' 7  It expressly designed the Act "to assure a mean-
ingful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able
to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him
and avoid the uninformed use of credit." 18 An implied purpose
of the Truth In Lending Act was to expose and thereby eliminate
14 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637-1639 (1976). Separate disclosure requirements apply to each
credit plan category. See note 13 supra.
Is 15 U.S.C. § 16 0 2 (g) (1976).
16 Id.
17 See id. § 1601(a).
18 Id. According to the National Commission on Consumer Finance, Congress designed
the Truth In Lending Act to serve three functions: a shopping function, a descriptive
function, and an economic stabilization function. See NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 171-
74. The Act serves the shopping function by enabling consumers to shop comparatively for
credit prices. Comparison shopping should help consumers avoid high-cost credit and
stimulate price competition among creditors. Id. at 172. The object of the descriptive func-
tion is to assist consumers in choosing whether to use credit, use liquid assets, or delay
consumption. Id. The economic stabilization function serves the dual purposes of prevent-
ing consumers from incurring excessive indebtedness and regulating credit use during
fluctuations in the economy. Id. at 174.
[Vol. 66:118
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unscrupulous credit practices. 19 Drafting legislation to effectuate
this purpose was difficult because, as the Supreme Court has
noted, "some creditors would attempt to characterize their trans-
actions so as to fall one step outside whatever boundary Congress
attempted to establish." 20 Such attempts to circumvent the Act, if
successful, subvert its effectiveness and leave consumers without
the protection envisioned by Congress.
II
THE EXCLUSION OF RENTAL PURCHASE CONTRACTS
A. Rental Purchase Contracts as Unregulated Merchandising Devices
In recent years, retailers of consumer durable goods have in-
troduced a novel merchandising device-the rental purchase
contract-into the highly competitive consumer credit market.21
'9 Proponents of the Act were aware that strong opposition within the credit industry
had hampered credit regulation efforts in the past. To avoid antagonizing the credit indus-
try unnecessarily, the Act's proponents may have strategically refrained from emphasizing,
as one of their goals, the policing of creditors' practices: "The bill contains no assumptions
that consumer credit is bad or that the vast majority of those who extend consumer credit
are engaged in deceitful practices. The bill contains no indictment of the credit industry as
a whole." S. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1967).
20 Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 365 (1973). Congress was
acutely aware that creditors might attempt to avoid the Truth In Lending Act's disclosure
requirements by manipulating the forms of their transactions. See, e.g., Truth In Lending
Bill: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Subcomm. on Production and Stabilization of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 49, 56-57 (1961) (statement and tes-
timony of J. Tobin, Council of Economic Advisers); id. at 389-90 (testimony of A. Haring,
consultant, National Retail Furniture Association); id. at 447-48 (testimony of Andrew
Bumiller, Director, Department of Legislation, AFL-CIO); id. at 563-64 (remarks of
Senator Bennett); 1155-56 (remarks of Senator Douglas); Truth In Lending Bill: Hearings on
S. 1740 Before the Subcomm. on Production and Stabilization of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 2, at 296 (statement of L. Rothschild, Executive Director,
Menswear Retailers of America); 1967 SEN. TIL HEARINGS, supra note 4, at 702-03 (state-
ment of D. Marlin, Neighborhood Legal Services Project of Washington, D.C.).
In 1979, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs recom-
mended amending the definition of open end credit plans (15 U.S.C. § 1637 (1976)) to
curb the use of "spurious" open end credit (characterization of a one-time credit extension
as a purchase on an "open end" or "revolving charge" plan). See S. REP. No. 73, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1979).
21 The advantages of consumer credit for retailers derive from the purchasing incen-
tives that credit availability gives to customers. To promote these incentives, many creditors
in the early 1960s focused sales efforts on consumers with low incomes. See FEDERAL TRADE
COMM'N, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL SALES PRAC-
TICES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS, MARCH 1968, reprinted in Consumer Credit and
the Poor: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 51 (1968) [hereinafter cited as FTC CREDIT PRAC-
TICEs REPORT (1968 HEARINGS)]. Such creditors, however, typically sold goods at prices far
in excess of market value, id. at 39, 107, and disguised total credit charges and credit rates
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Rental purchase contracts are short term leases that give the lessee
the option to purchase the merchandise.22 They bind consumers
to pay short-term rental fees. At the end of a rental term, the
agreement automatically terminates and the customer must return
the property, unless he renews the contract by paying the fee for
another term. 23 The retailer has the right to collect rent while the
consumer possesses the goods, and to recover the goods, plus
damages for diminished value, excepting normal wear and tear, at
the end of the term. The retailer retains title to the goods but
must provide maintenance and pay any property taxes.2 4
The central feature of the rental purchase contract, however,
is the option it gives the consumer to purchase the property by
simply renewing the agreement for a specified number of succes-
sive terms. This purchase option, 25 along with low weekly pay-
ments and the lack of an initial down payment, makes the rental
purchase contract particularly attractive to low-income consum-
ers 26 who have been closed out of more traditional credit mar-
as "fees, charges, discounts, and the like .. " 106 CONG. REC. 97 (1960) (statement of
Senator Douglas). See, e.g., FTC CREDIT PRACTICES REPORT (1968 HEARINGS), supra, at 99;
1967 SEN. TIL HEARINGS, supra note 4, at 700-02.
22 See SAMPLE RENTAL PURCHASE CONTRACT at Appendix infra. The reprinted sample is
the form contract at issue in Johnson v. McNamara, No. H-78-238 (D. Conn. Apr. 12,
1979). The lessor in Johnson asserted that the rental agreement typified those used in other
transactions. See Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment and To Dismiss, Johnson v.
McNamara, No. H-78-238 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 1979). Similarly, several courts have noted
that the terms of the contracts they construed contained contractual terms resembling
those that the Federal Reserve Board described in its staff opinion letters. See note 37
infra.
Further highlighting the general similarity between rental purchase contracts
employed by different retailers is the fact that a national manufacturer of televisions and
stereos provides franchised dealers with a form rental purchase contract that the dealers
may use at their option. Moreover, there is notable similarity among rental purchase con-
tracts that have been the subject of disputes resulting in litigation. For example, the plain-
tiff's attorney in Turner v. Curtis Mathes Centers, Inc., No. 3-78-1135 (D. Minn. Mar.
1979), commented that the disputed rental agreement was identical to the contract that
another court construed in Johnson v. McNamara, No. H-78-238 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 1979).
Telephone interview with Jerry Lane, Esq., Minnesota Legal Services (Oct. 15, 1979).
23 See SAMPLE RENTAL PURCHASE CONTRACT at Appendix infra.
24 Id.
25 Rental purchase contracts specify the number of successive renewals required before
exercising the purchase option. A standard form rental purchase contract may indicate, for
example, that "[i]n the event renter at his sole election renews this rental agreement for one
hundred four successive one-week terms, owner will transfer the property to renter." See
SAMPLE RENTAL PURCHASE CONTRACT at Appendix infra (emphasis added). Such language
clarifies that the lessee retains power to avoid a complete transfer of title.
26 See notes 27-28 and accompanying text infra. One commentator has noted that
"[rietailers who sell to lower-income consumers use installment credit in a much higher
percentage of their sales than do retailers selling to the general public." Harrison, supra
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kets.2 Without other sources of credit, the low income consumer
may view the rental purchase contract as his only means of obtain-
ing certain household goods.28 Because they provide a convenient
means to finance the purchase of consumer goods, rental pur-
chase contracts are functionally equivalent to credit sales.2"
Despite their similarity to credit sales, rental purchase con-
tracts are not currently regulated under the Truth In Lending
Act.30 Retailers employing rental purchase contracts can keep
transactions beyond the Act's scope by literally interpreting the
Act's "credit sale" definition. They argue that rental purchase con-
tracts do not meet the definition's first condition, which requires
that the lessee be contractually bound to pay a sum equal to or
greater than the value of the property.3' On their face they ap-
note 2, at 3. A Federal Trade Commission study of credit use found that installment credit
was widely used to market appliances and home furnishings to low-income families and
that, as a group, retailers selling to a low-income market made about 93% of their sales
through installment credit. See FTC CREDIT PRACTICES REPORT (1968 HEARINGS), supra
note 21, at 40. The study concluded that "[w]hat competition there is among low-income
market retailers apparently takes the form of easier credit availability, rather than of lower
prices." Id. at 41. See generally D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES
OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES (1963) (case study of low-income market retailers in New York).
Low-income consumers seeking credit typically rely on retail stores to make the ar-
rangements. A study of consumer awareness of annual percentage rates revealed that "just
over half of middle and upper income whites relied on the retailer to provide or arrange
credit." NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 180. However, "[iln contrast, four-fifths of minority
customers depended on the dealer, and about seven-tenths of low-income (under $7,500)
whites" either used the retailer's installment charge plan or let the dealer make other ar-
rangements. Id.
27 According to the National Commission on Consumer Finance, the low-income con-
sumer's heavy dependence on dealers for credit results from a paucity of other legal credit
sources. See NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 180. As the Commission observed, "[tihere are
no small loan offices in Harlem or the District of Columbia. There are relatively few low-
income members of credit unions.... Direct bank credit is also generally less available in
the high-risk market."Id. at 180-81. See 1967 SEN. TIL HEARINGS, supra note 4, at 699, 702
(statement of David H. Marlin, Deputy Director for Law Reform and Education,
Neighborhood Legal Services Project of Washington, D.C.).
28 See note 27 and accompanying text supra. The absence of alternative credit sources
prompts low-income consumers to endure the disadvantageous aspects of rental purchase
contracts. See note 33 infra.
29 Retailers typically seek to avoid the characterization of the rental purchase contract
arrangement as a "credit sale" by including bold-faced provisions such as the caption "This
is a Rental Agreement Only." See, e.g., SAMPLE RENTAL PURCHASE CONTRACT at Appendix
infra. The appropriate characterization of such arrangements, however, remains unclear,
because legislative, administrative, and judicial efforts to demarcate a clear definitional dis-
tinction between rental purchase contracts and "credit sales," for purposes of determining
the applicability of the Truth In Lending Act, have been unsatisfactory. See notes 75-94
and accompanying text infra.
30 See notes 36-39, 43-46, and accompanying text infra.
" See text at notes 15-16 supra.
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pear not to fulfill this condition because they do not obligate
a lessee to pay rent beyond a single term. 2 In addition, such
agreements do not require payments to equal or exceed the proper-
ty's value; they divide what would ordinarily be a lease agreement
in which the rental fee would equal or exceed the value of the
property into a series of short term, renewable contracts, each re-
quiring payment of a rental fee substantially less than the value of
the property. 33 Rental purchase contracts, therefore, arguably fall
outside the literal terms of the Truth In Lending Act's "credit
sale" definition, 34 and may be exempt from the Act's regula-
tions .3 5
32 See note 25 and text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
33 See note 25 supra.
34 The consumer's express power to stop payments and terminate the arrangement
contrasts with the mandatory "contracts to pay" requirement in the pivotal "credit sale"
definition. Indeed, the lessee under a rental purchase contract renews,"at his sole election",
see note 28 supra, whereas the person acquiring property in a credit sale "contracts to pay
... a sum" without reservation. See text accompanyinging notes 15-16 supra.
35 More persuasive grounds support the exemption of rental purchase contracts from
the Truth In Leasing Act, which Congress enacted in 1976. Consumer Leasing Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, 90 Stat. 257 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1640, 1667-1667e
(1976)). The Truth In Leasing Act defines a consumer lease as
[a] contract in the form of a lease or bailment for the use of personal property
by a natural person for a period of time exceeding four months, and for a total
contractual obligation not exceeding $25,000 ... whether or not the lessee has
the option to purchase or otherwise become the owner of the property at the
expiration of the lease, except that such term shall not include any credit sale as
defined in section 16 0 2 (g) of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 1667 (1976) (emphasis added). Because a rental purchase contract does not
bind the lessee to rent beyond a single short-term period, the mandatory rental term is
invariably shorter than four months. This renders the disclosure requirements of the
Truth in Leasing Act inapplicable. See note 90 infra.
Accordingly, the Federal Reserve Board maintains that leases similar to rental pur-
chase contracts are exempt from Truth In Leasing disclosure requirements because they
do not meet the four-month term requirement. In an unofficial staff opinion letter discus-
sing whether leases for respective terms of four months, three months, and month-to-
month were "consumer leases," the Board stated:
It is the staff's opinion that none of the [rental purchase] contracts ... is a
"consumer lease" under the Consumer Leasing Act or Regulation Z .... [A]
lease of personal property ... on a month-to-month basis (even though the
lease extends beyond four months) is not a consumer lease within the meaning
of the Act and would not be subject to the disclosure requirements of Regula-
tion Z....
Fed. Res. Bd. Letter No. 1169 (March 28, 1977), reprinted in [1974-1977 Transfer Binder]
CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,566. The Board added, however, that disclosure require-
ments of the Truth in Leasing Act do not apply only if "a term of four months or less is
not emlloyed by the lessor for the purpose of circumvention or evasion of the statutory or
regulatory requirements." Id. This reflects the Board's awareness that unconditional non-
regulation of rental purchase contracts could open the door to abuse in certain situations.
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B. The Position of the Federal Reserve Board
The Federal Reserve Board 36 has unofficially ruled that the
Act does not encompass rental purchase contracts. 37 The Board
claims that because the lessee's option to terminate the rental ne-
gates any obligation to pay full market value for the property, the
transaction falls outside section 160 2 (g)'s definition of "credit
sale."38 The Board recommended in 1977 that Congress amend
the credit sale definition to codify its administrative position. 39
Congress, however, did not act on the Board's proposal.
36 Congress empowered the Federal Reserve Board to enforce disclosure under the
Truth In Lending Act:
The [Federal Reserve] Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the pur-
poses of [the Act]. These regulations may contain such classifications, differen-
tiations, or other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and excep-
tions for any class of transactions, as in the judgment of the Board are neces-
sary or proper to effectuate the purposes of [the Act], to prevent circumvention
or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith.
15 U.S.C § 1604 (1976). See text accompanying notes 36 & 75-77 infra.
37 The Federal Reserve Board has issued three unofficial staff opinion letters concern-
ing the regulation of rental purchase contracts. In response to an inquiry about whether
the Truth In Lending Act and Regulation Z would apply to a rental agreement similar to
the SAMPLE RENTAL PURCHASE CONTRACT at Appendix infra, a Board staff member advised
that Regulation Z did not apply because the
lease agreement may be cancelled at any time, given 30 days prior notice, at no
cost or penalty to the customer.... Therefore, a lessee under the plan [has not]
contra&ed "to pay as compensation for the use a sum substantially equivalent to
or in excess of the aggregate value of the property or services involved."
Fed. Res. Bd. Letter No. 750 (Jan. 11, 1974), reprinted in [1969-1974 Transfer Binder]
CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,069, (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(n) (1975)).
In a second unofficial staff opinion letter, Jarauld C. Kluckman, Associate Director of
the Board's Truth In Lending Section, reached the same conclusion: "In light of the con-
sumer lessee's option to terminate without liability ... we believe that the lease transaction
referred to would not be subject to Regulation Z." Fed. Res. Bd. Letter No. 761 (Mar. 12,
1974), reprinted in [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,083. Two
years later, Mr. Kluckman reaffirmed his opinion in a third unofficial staff letter:
It is staff's opinion that the lease agreement in question does not fall within the
definition of a "credit sale" because it does meet the first requirement as set
forth in § 226.2(t) [of Regulation Z]. We note that the lease agreement contains
an express provision permitting termination of the lease agreement at any time,
by either party, upon 30 days prior written notice. Such termination by the
lessee results in no penalty or additional cost being imposed upon the lessee.
Therefore, the lessee ... has not contracted "to pay as compensation for use a
sum substantially equivalent to or in excess of the aggregate value of the prop-
erty and services involved."
Fed. Res. Bd. Letter No. 1192 (June 15, 1977), reprinted in [1974-1977 Transfer Binder]
CONS. CPED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,623, (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(t) (1975)).
38 See note 34 supra. The Federal Reserve Board similarly claims that the rental pur-
chase contract transaction is not subject to the disclosure requirements of the Truth In Leas-
ing Act, because it does not satisfy the four-month term requirement. See note 35 supra.
31 See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, DRAFT BILL ON SIMPLIFI-
CATION OF TRUTH IN LENDING § 104(2) (1977), reprinted in Simplify and Reform the Truth In
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The Board's refusal to classify rental purchase contracts as
credit sales comports with its traditional reluctance to subject any
arrangements that resemble leases to regulation under the Truth
In Lending Act. In 1967, the Board recommended that because
of the difficulty of computing finance charges on true leases, 40
Congress should draft the credit sale definition to exclude them
from the proposed Truth In Lending Act. In 1975, the Board
proposed that Congress amend the Act to exclude disguised leases
as well.4 1 Congress, aware that excluding leases from the Truth
In Lending Act might encourage installment creditors to use lease
arrangements to avoid credit disclosure, 42 declined to implement
either proposal.
Lending Act: Hearings on S. 1312, S. 1501, and S. 1653 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 60,
65 (1977). The Board proposed that the new definition include "instances where the con-
sumer becomes contractually obligated to purchase property or services and cannot cancel
without substantial penalty.... This would codify the present administrative construction
of the Act." BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: MEMORANDUM
ANALYSIS ISSUES IN BOARD'S DRAFT BILL ON SIMPLIFICATION OF TRUTH IN LENDING (1977),
reprinted in Simplify and Reform the Truth in Lending Act: Hearings on S. 1312, S. 1501, and S.
1653 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1977). The Board desired to provide "a more or-
derly way [of] making clear which transactions are covered." Id. See note 35 supra.
40 During the 1967 Senate Truth In Lending hearings, Governor Robertson of the
Federal Reserve Board testified that it is impossible to calculate a finance charge on a true
lease. See 1967 SEN. TIL HEARINGS, supra note 4, at 663. Creditors compute finance
charges on regular credit sales by reference to either the total amount financed, or the
difference between the cash selling price and the deferred payment price; charges for
rentals, however, derive from the use of property, not from its value. Id. See also id. at 353
(statement of Darrel M. Holt, Mortgage Bankers Association of America); id. at 401 (state-
ment of Douglas Hewitt, Executive Secretary, Farm and Industrial Equipment Institute).
41 See, e.g., [1975] BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ANN. REP.
TO CONGRESS ON TRUTH IN LENDING App. B, at 5. The Board believed that the Truth In
Leasing Act would suffice to cover lease arrangements that prove to be disguised credit
sales. See Truth-In-Leasing: Hearings on H.R. 4657 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of
the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1975).
42 Congresswoman Leonor Sullivan, for example, questioned the advisability of remov-
ing disguised leases from the ambit of Truth In Lending regulation:
[11f H.R. 4657 were to become law as introduced, including § 104(a) repealing
the provisions of § 103(g) of the Truth In Lending Act applying to certain
leases, would there not be an incentive to installment credit sellers to adopt
consumer leases as a means of avoiding annual percentage-rate disclosure, so
that one of the major purposes of Truth In Lending would destroyed?
Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendment to the Consumer Leasing Act of 1978: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, 21 (1978)
(reprinting letter from Representative Sullivan to the Honorable Jeffrey Bucher, Federal
Reserve System (July 8, 1978)). In response, Mr. Bucher stated:
While H.R. 4657 will not require the disclosure of an annual percentage rate,
as would be the case under Truth In Lending, we doubt the practicality of
requiring rate disclosures in connection with leasing.
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C. Judicial Responses
Five out of the seven United States district courts that have
considered the question have held that rental purchase contracts
are not credit sales as defined by the Truth In Lending Act.43
These courts found that the rental purchase agreements clearly
provided that the lessee would become the owner of the property
by paying the specified number of rental fees.4" Nonetheless, the
courts deferred to the Federal Reserve Board's position 4' and
held that the transactions were not credit sales because they did
not obligate the lessees to pay the full values of their lease prop-
erty. 4
6
The two courts most recently confronting the issue, however,
found that the rental purchase contracts involved were function-
ally equivalent to credit sales. 47 One court stated: "For all practi-
With reference to the question of whether a partial repeal of section 103(g)
[15 U.S.C. § 1602(g)] would provide a loophole and incentive for certain cred-
itors to convert their credit sale agreements into leases and, thus, avoid the
requirement of disclosing annual percentage rates, we doubt that the complica-
tions involved in making such conversions to leases would lead creditors to
change their agreements merely to avoid annual percentage rate disclosures.
id. at 31-32.
4' Dorsey v. Curtis Mathes Sales Co., No. 4-78 Civ. 436 (D. Minn. Mar. 23, 1979);
Turner v. Curtis Mathes Centers, Inc., No. 3-78-1135(D) (D. Minn. Mar. 1979); Smith v.
ABC Rental Sys., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. La. 1978); Clark v. Aquarius TV Rental,
Inc., No. CA 4-77-133 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 1977); Terrell v. Mr. T's Rental, No. C75-
2053A (N.D. Ga. June 4, 1976); Griggs v. Easy TV & Rental, Inc., No. C75-2509A (N.D.
Ga. April 8, 1976). But see Waldron v. Best T.V. & Stereo Rentals, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 718
(D. Md. 1979); Johnson v. McNamara, No. H-78-238 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 1979).
44 In Smith v. ABC Rental Sys., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. La. 1978), the written
rental purchase contract did not contain an express purchase option, although the retailer
had widely advertised it. The court, however, did not reach the issue of whethei the lessee
had a purchase option, because it found the lease did not meet the "contracts to pay"
condition.
4' See note 37 supra.
46 The court in Smith v. ABC Rental Sys., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. La. 1978) did
not cite the Board's opinion letters. In three other cases, the courts relied solely on the
Federal Reserve Board letters (discussed at notes 35 & 37 supra). See Clark v. Aquarius TV
Rental, Inc., No. CA 4-77-133 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 1977); Griggs v. Easy TV & Rental, Inc.,
No. C75-2509A (N.D. Ga. Apr. 8, 1976); Boyd v. ABC Rental Sys., Inc., No. C74-456-L(B)
(W.D. Ky. Sept. 12, 1975). In Terrell v. Mr. T's Rental, No. C75-2503A (N.D. Ga. June 4,
1976) the court adhered to its holding in Griggs and dismissed the case with little additional
discussior of the merits. Two recent courts cited Smith, Clark, Terrell, Griggs, Boyd, and the
Federal Reserve Board letters in summarily rejecting the lessee's attempt to characterize
the rental purchase contract as a conditional sales contract. See Dorsey v. Curtis Mathes
Sales Co., No. 4-73 Civ. 436 (D. Minn. Mar. 23, 1979); Turner v. Curtis Mathes Centers,
Inc., No. 3-78-1135(D) (D. Minn. Mar. 1979).
47 Waldron v. Best TV & Stereo Rentals, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 718 (D. Md. 1979);Johnson
v. McNamara, No. H-78-238 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 1979).
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cal purposes, ... the 'rental' relationship established by this form
contract is indistinguishable from a credit sale, in which the cred-
itor has agreed to sell the item to the debtor, the purchase price
being payable over a two year period." 48 Both courts declined to
adopt the Federal Reserve Board's position and held that the
transactions could be credit sales subject to the Truth In Lending
Act's provisions.49
III
THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXCLUSION
A. Effects on Retailers and Consumers
Functionally equivalent to ordinary credit sales, 50 but not
generally considered to be subject to the Truth In Lending Act's
restrictions,51 rental purchase contracts are a highly attractive sales
In Waldron, the court relied upon prior cases dcided under the state's Uniform
Commercial Code in rejecting the argument that the rental purchase contract was not a
credit sale. The court observed that agreements in prior cases had been characterized
under the UCC as conditional sales, notwithstanding inclusion of a lessee's termination
option. Further, public policy favored subjecting the disputed agreement to the Truth In
Lending Act's provisions:
Under the terms of the agreement involved in this case, [the lessee] will own
the television set if the 78 successive weekly payments are made. Yet, without
the disclosure contemplated by the Act, [the lessee] faces a difficult problem in
calculating the rate of interest being charged; practically, she is unable to shop
for credit, and the purpose of the statute is frustrated.
Waldron v. Best TV & Stereo Rentals, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 718, 720 (D. Md. 1979).
48 Johnson v. McNamara, No. H-78-238 slip op. at 4 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 1979). The
court found that Congress intended courts considering whether a transaction is a disguised
sale or true lease to follow commercial law principles. The court reasoned that under the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code, the issue of whether
an agreement was a true lease or disguised sale typically depends on whether the contract
permits the lessee to acquire title to the property.
In the court's view, conditional sales agreements and rental purchase contracts differ
only because under the latter a lessee can cancel without incurring liability through a defi-
ciency judgment. In Connecticut, however, the Retail Installment Sales, Financing, Trading
Practices, Home Solicitation Sales Act prohibits the collection of deficiency judgments. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-98(0 (1979). Therefore, the McNamara court reasoned, the legal
obligations between the parties to a rental purchase contract are functionally the same as
they would have been had the lessee unequivocally agreed to purchase the property
through installments. Slip op. at 11.
The court concluded that the rental purchase contract was a credit sale within the
meaning of the Truth In Lending Act. Id. The Court's decision hinged on the Connecticut
Retail Installment Sales Act's prohibition of deficiency judgments in conditional sales. The
court specifically declined to decide whether the Federal Reserve Board opinion letters
correctly interpreted "credit sale." Slip op. at 14 n.3.
41 Waldron v. Best TV & Stereo Rentals, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 718 (D. Md. 1979) (deny-
ing motion for summary judgment); Johnson v. McNamara, No. H-78-238 slip. op. at II
(D. Conn. Apr. 12, 1979).
50 See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra; notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
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device for retailers. 52  By stating only a weekly rental fee, the re-
tailer may conceal the costs of deferred payment as well as the
total purchase price of the property. This allows him to reap the
benefits of credit sales, while avoiding the liabilities and regula-
tions that the Truth In Lending Act imposes on other lenders. It
also gives him an unfair competitive advantage over retailers of-
fering conventional credit sales. 53
The exclusion of rental purchase contracts creates the same
problems for credit consumers that led Congress to enact the
Truth In Lending Act twelve years ago. Undisclosed credit infor-
mation limits the consumer's ability to shop comparatively for the
best deal, 54 and enables creditors to impose harsh, unfair terms
on consumers, 55 who are left without the remedies provided by
52 Retailers using rental purchase contracts may derive substantial profits not available
through other payment arrangements. They may, for example, receive as much as double
the retail price of the item before transferring title to the consumer. In Griggs v. Easy TV
& Rental, Inc., No. C75-2509A (N.D. Ga. Apr. 8, 1976), the consumer rented a stereo for
$45 per week. Under the purchase option, the lessee would receive title after 18 consecu-
tive weekly rentals, for a total lease-purchase price of $810. The retailer admitted that the
cash retail value of the stereo was only $350. Id. at Exhibit "H" (recommendation of special
master). Similarly, in Turner v. Curtis Mathes Centers, Inc., No. 3-78-1135(D) (D. Minn,
March 1979), the bi-weekly rental fee for a television set was $31,10. The arrangement
required 78 successive weekly rentals, equalling a total lease-purchase price of $1212.90,
before the lessee acquired ownership. The television, which previously had been rented to
other customers, had a retail value of only $773. Id., slip. op. at 2.
If the consumer fails to exercise the purchase option, the retailer keeps all rental fees
paid, regains possession of the lease property, and is free to sell the property or rent it
again. See id. In Turner, the consumer paid the rental fee for 44 consecutive weeks, which
represented approximately 88% of the $773 retail value of the television. See id. When the
consumer failed to renew the contract, however, the retailer retained the rental fees and
rented the property again. Id.
Many consumers fail to maintain rentals beyond several months. See Smith v. ABC
Rental Sys. of New Orleans, No. 77-2733, slip op. at 3 (E.D. La. Aug. 11, 1978) (retailer
testified that 73% of customers kept goods less than four months).
5' Unfair advantage may result from the favorable appearance of the transaction. Re-
tailers offering ordinary credit sales must make disclosures pursuant to the Act. The ab-
sence of such disclosure in rental purchase contracts may cause consumers to presume that
the retailer provides free credit. See note 54 infra.
'4 The Truth In Lending Act facilitates comparison shopping by requiring that con-
sumers be provided with uniformly computed itemizations of credit costs. An unregulated
rental purchase contract, however, aggregates all costs of the transaction into a single (e.g.,
weekly) fee. The fee may or may not include a charge for the right to defer payment.
Because finance charges are buried in the rental fee, the consumer is unable to ascertain
directly whether the rental purchase contract or a regular credit sale is more economical.
Similarly, rental purchase contracts do not state the total purchase price of the property.
This hinders comparison of rental purchase contract arrangements with outright pur-
chases. See notes 7, 18, and accompanying text supra.
" The potential harshness of the terms of a rental purchase contract offsets the attrac-
tiveness of the low weekly payments and lack of initial deposit. For example, the lease-
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the Truth In Lending Act. This stacks the odds against the con-
sumer ever fulfilling his hopes of ownership.
B. Effectuating Congressional Intent
The Truth In Lending Act signifies "a transition in congres-
sional policy from a philosophy of 'Let the buyer beware' to one
of 'Let the seller disclose.' "36 The Federal Reserve Board's posi-
tion that a lessee's option to terminate a rental purchase contract
brings it outside the ambit of the Act is inconsistent with congres-
sional intent. First, the Board's position fails to recognize that the
Truth In Lending Act's remedial nature implies that the Act's
terms merit liberal construction to eliminate unscrupulous and
predatory credit practices." Second, it violates the long-standing
commercial law principle, incorporated in the Truth In Lending
Act, that characterizations of commercial transactions should favor
substance over form. 58
property might be used merchandise. See, e.g., Turner v. Curtis Mathes Centers, Inc., No.
33-78-1135(D), slip op. at 2 (D. Minn. Mar. 1979). The maintenance agreement may ter-
minate before the consumer owns the goods. See SAMPLE RENTAL PURCHASE CONTRACT at
Appendix infra (maintenance obligation expiring three months before potential ownership
transfer to lessee). The payment schedule is perhaps as long as 104 weeks, during which
time a single missed payment entitles'the retailer to repossess the goods. Finally, the con-
tract may authorize the retailer to remove the lease property from the consumer's prem-
ises, and require the consumer to release and discharge all claims or causes of action
relating to his entry.
The use of rental purchase contracts victimizes low-income consumers. Consumers
with limited education and low-income lack the resources to challenge-and thus are more
vulnerable to-disingeneous credit practices. See generally FTC CREDIT PRACTICES REPORT
(1968 HEARINGS), supra note 21, at 41. In comparing wholesale and retail prices of best-
selling products in the low-income market and the general market, the Federal Trade
Commission concluded that
the low-income market is a very expensive place to buy durable goods.... The
mosj probable reason is that the poor ... are attracted by the more liberal
credit policies.... Low-income market retailers ... feature "easy credit," but
the customer pays a great deal for this privilege in the form of grossly higher
prices.
Id. at 58.
Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973).
s See id.; Sellers v. Wollman, 510 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1975) (Truth In Lending Act
liberally construed in favor of the consumer); N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors of the
Fed. Res. Sys., 473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973) (statute's
remedial nature requires that its terms be construed liberally to effectuate underlying con-
gressional purpose); Sneed v. Beneficial Finance Co., 410 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Hawaii 1976)
(Truth In Lending Act viewed as remedial, to be construed liberally).
5s In 1876, the Supreme Court stated that "[iun determining the real character of a
contract, courts will always look to its purpose, rather than to the name given to it by the
parties." Hervey v. Rhode Island Locom. Works, 93 U.S. 664, 672 (1876). See notes 66-74
and accompanying text infra.
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1. The Scope of "Credit Sale"
The legislative history of section 16 02 (g) of the Act suggests
that Congress intended to regulate rental purchase arrangements.
The initial credit cost disclosure bill before Congress in 1960 de-
fined "credit" as "any loan, residential mortgage, deed of trust,
advance, or discount; any conditional sales contract; any contract
to sell or sale, . . . any rental-purchase contract; any contract or
arrangement for the hire, bailment, or leasing of property ... and
any transaction or series of transactions having a similar purpose
or effect." 5" This definition encompasses the typical rental
purchase transaction, either as a "rental purchase contract" 60 or
59 S. 2755, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(1), 106 CONG. REC. 97 (1960). This definition of
'credit" resembled the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation (12 C.F.R. § 222.8(h)(3) (1949)),
which was derived from Executive Order No. 8843, 3 C.F.R. 976 (1938-1943 Compilation).
The Executive Order defined the "extension of credit" as
any loan or mortgage; any installment purchase contract, any conditional sales
contract, or any sale or contract of sale under which part or all of the price is
payable subsequent to the making of such sale or contract; any rental-purchase
contract, or any contract for the bailment or leasing of property under which
the bailee or lessee either has the option of becoming the owner thereof or
obligates himself to pay as compensation a sum substantially equivalent to or in
excess of the value thereof; any contract creating any lien or similar claim or
property to be discharged by the payment of money; any purchase, discount, or
otheracquisition of, or any extension of credit upon the security of, any obliga-
tion or claim arising out of any of the foregoing; and any transaction or series
of transactions having a similar purpose or effect.
Id. § 4(e), 3 C.F.R. at 979 (1938-1943 Compilation) (emphasis added).
60 See FRB Interpretation § 222.112, 13 Fed. Reg. 7326 (1948). The Board determined
that a particular rental purchase arrangement was either an extension of installment credit
or a delivery in anticipation of an installment sale:
§ 222.112 Rental-purchase arrangements. In order to increase the sale of a
certain type of listed article [see 12 C.F.R. § 222.9 (1949)], a company proposes
to rent and deliver to interested persons for use in their homes, such articles
for one month at a charge of $5 under a written rental agreement which contains no
obligation or option for the purchase of the article. However, before the expiration of
the 30-day period, either there would be a sale of an article of the type deliv-
ered, or the article that was delivered would be returned to, and reconditioned
by, the company for sale elsewhere. In the event of a completed sale, the
lessee-purchaser could either retain the article previously delivered to him or
receive a new article. If the former should occur, the regular retail purchase
price would be reduced by $5; but if the latter should occur, no such reduction
in price would be made. The reduced purchase price or the regular purchase
price, as the case may be, would be treated as the selling price subject to the
down payment, maturity and monthly payment provisions of Part 222.
The absence from the written rental agreement of an obligation or option to
buy would not be deemed to be of controlling significance in circumstances such as
these. Viewed in their entirety, the transactions in question look toward the completion of
a sale and, at the outset, should comply with [this part] either as an ordinary
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as a series of transactions having a similar purpose or effect.6 1
The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency abandoned
the original section defining "credit" 62 and substituted separate
definitions of "credit" 63 and "credit sales." 64 The Committee em-
phasized, however, its continued intent to include disguised leases
within the meaning of "credit sales." 65
extension of installment credit or as a delivery in anticipation of an installment
sale under § 2 2 2 .6 (g).
Id. (emphasis added). The Board's interpretation makes clear that the absence of an obliga-
tion to buy does not preclude characterizing a transaction as an extension of installment
credit. More surprisingly, the Board asserts that the absence of even an option in the con-
sumer to buy does not preclude an arrangement from constituting, for disclosure require-
ment purposes, an "extension of installment credit" or "a delivery in anticipation of an
installment sale." Id. This analysis clearly includes rental purchase contracts in the defini-
tion of credit sale.
61 A series of rental purchase contracts can be functionally equivalent to a "conditional
sale." Under both arrangements, the consumer has possession and use of the good while
he makes regular payments towards its purchase price, and eventually owns the good.
62 See text accompanying note 59 supra. The Committee did not explain why it dis-
carded the definition, but observed that "[t]he original language was deleted because it was
somewhat cumbersome and sweeping and referred to various types of lease situations
which might not be true extensions of credit." S. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 12
(1967). Witnesses who testified at hearings probably convinced the Committee that the
definition, construed literally, could produce "bizarre results which the drafters cannot
have intended." 1967 SEN. TIL HEARINGS, supra note 4, at 401..(statement of Douglas
Hewitt, Executive Secretary, Farm and Equipment Institute); see id. at 353 (statement of
Darrel M. Holt, Mortgage Bankers Association of America); id. at 663 (statement of J.L.
Robertson, Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). Under the
definition, for example, a one week car rental could involve "credit" for which the cus-
tomer pays a charge. Id. at 401 (statement of Douglas Hewitt). Similar charges were
raised and rebutted during the Senate hearings on another bill, which contained an identi-
cal definition of credit. See S. 750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(2), reprinted in Truth In
Lending-1963-64: Hearings on S. 750 Before the Subcomm. on Production and Stabilization of
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1298, 1304 (1963-1964).
63 Governor Robertson of the Federal Reserve Board testified that "it would be pref-
erable to define credit as 'the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of
debt or to incur debt and defer its payment,' followed by an enumeration of some of the
important types of credit listed in section 3(2) of the present bill." 1967 SEN. TIL HEAR-
INGS, supra note 4, at 663. The Senate adopted Governor Robertson's suggestion in its
definition of "credit". See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1976).
64 See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (1976).
65 The Committee noted in the report accompanying S. 5 that the definition of "credit
sale" "also makes it clear that credit means [the] bailment lease situations described further
in section 3(c)." S. REP. No. 392, supra note 19, at 12. According to Governor Robertson,
this new definition was sufficiently broad to cover any situation the Federal Reserve System
perceived to be within the intent of S. 5. 1967 SEN. TIL HEARINGS, supra note 4, at 663.
The language pertaining to disguised leases is nearly identical to that used to distin-
guish between true leases and conditional sales in the form of leases under the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act:
In this Act "Conditional sale" means ... (2) any contract for the bailments or
leasing of goods by which the bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation
a sum substantially equivalent to the value of the goods, and by which it is
agreed that the bailee or lessee is bound to become, or has the option of becom-
1980] TRUTH IN LENDING
2. Characterizing the Transaction
Congress imported concepts from the field of commercial
law into the Truth In Lending Act.66  In commercial law gener-
ally, the characterization of a particular transaction depends on
the intent of the parties, as shown by express provisions of their
agreement, and by facts underlying the entire transaction.67
a. Express Provisions. When courts interpret express provisions
in an agreement to determine if it is encompassed by the Truth
In Lending Act, they should construe the parties' intentions by
examining the treatment of similar provisions in other areas of
commercial law. One such analogy, whether a transaction is a true
lease or an installment sale, is one of the most frequently litigated
questions under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).68 Section
1-201(37) of the UCC states:
ing the owner of such goods upon full compliance with the terms of the con-
tract.
UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT § 1 (act withdrawn 1943). According to the drafters'
comments that accompanied § 1:
It is well known that some sellers attempt to evade the conditional sale
recording acts by calling the contract a "lease" . . . and providing for the pay-
ment of "rent." Wherever these "leases" are substantially equivalent to condi-
tional sales, they should be subject to the same restrictions. This equivalency
seems to exist when the buyer is bound to pay rent substantially equal to the
value of the goods and has the option of becoming or is to become the owner
of the goods after all the rent is paid.
UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT § 1, Commissioners' Note (act withdrawn 1943). For an
interpretation of § 1 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, see Coogan, Leases of Equipment
and Some Other Unconventional Security Devices: An Analysis of U.C.C. Section 1-201(37) and
Article 9, 1973 DUKE L.J. 909, 936-38, 941. Professor Coogan interprets § 1 of the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act to require an absolute obligation on the part of a lessee to pay an
amount substantially equivalent to the purchase price of the lease property for the transac-
tion to qualify as a conditional sale. Id. at 941.
66 For example, Congress's definition of "credit sale" was adapted from the old Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act's definition of "conditional sale." See UNIFORM CONDITIONAL
SALES ACT § 1 (act withdrawn 1943). The definition of "credit" was taken from the pro-
posed Uniform Consumer Credit Code. See S. REP. No. 392, supra note 19, at 12.
67 One court observed that in construing the Truth In Lending Act "the Federal Re-
serve Board and the majority of courts have focused on the substance, rather than the
form, of credit transactions .. " Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 532 F.2d 86, 90
(8th Cir. 1976). They examine "the practices of the trade, the course of dealing of the
parties, and the intention of the parties in addition to specific contractual obligations." Id.
Another court explained that "[elach transaction must be factually evaluated in the light of
all relevant evidence, to determine whether that particular transaction constituted a viola-
tion of the Act." Haskins v. American Buyers Club, Inc., 77 F.R.D. 715, 717 (S.D. Ill. 1978)
(dictum). See also Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 539 F.2d 511, 515 (5th Cir. 1976)
("[defendant's] argument elevates form over substance in an effort to avoid the realities of
the credit transaction").
6 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 878 (2d ed. 1980).
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[w]hether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by
the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to
purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended for
security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the
terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to
become the owner of the property for no additional considera-
tion or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one
intended for security. 69
According to case law developed under the UCC, express contrac-
tual provisions that limit the lessor's remedies, deny the lessee
equity in the property, and allow the lessee to terminate the
agreement suggest that a transaction is a lease. In contrast, contract
terms that transfer ownership to the lessee, grant the lessee the
right to renew the rental, and require rental fee payments total-
ling substantially more than the property's market value, indicate
that an agreement is a credit sale.7 0  Although a termination
clause negates the lessee's obligation to pay the property's full
69 U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
11 According to Professors White and Summers, several contractual terms suggest that
a transaction is a true lease:
(a) Provision specifying purchase option price which is approximately the
market value at the time of the exercise of the option.
(b) Rental charges indicating an intention to compensate lessor for loss of
value over the term of the lease due to aging, wear and obsolescence.
(c) Rentals which are not excessive and option purchase price which is not
too low.
(d) Facts showing that the lessee is acquiring no equity in leased article
during the term of lease.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 68, at 879 (citing In re Alpha Creamery Co., 4 U.C.C.
Rep. 794, 798 (W.D. Mich. 1967)). Contractual terms supporting characterization: as a "sec-
urity interest" include (1) provisions stating that upon making periodic payments for the
required time, the lessee automatically becomes the owner "without paying anything addi-
tional"; (2) a purchase option affording the lessee no economic choice but to exercise the
option at the end of the lease term; (3) terms making the lessee the financer; (4) stipula-
tions requiring the lessee to pay for taxes, repairs, maintenance, and for insurance on the
goods with the lessor as beneficiary; (5) a clause giving the lessor the option to accelerate
payments upon the lessee's default. See id. at 880-83.
Besides the lease agreement itself, other factors must be considered, such as the expec-
tations of the parties, whether the "lessor" is in the business of renting or selling goods,
and whether the lessee has an option to renew the lease. See Claxton, Lease or Security
Interest: A Classic Problem of Commercial Law, 28 MERCER L. REv. 599 (1977); Coogan, supra
note 65, at 956-64.
An analogous problem is ascertaining if a transaction constitutes a "sale" under Article
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, or if the transaction is not encompassed by the
Code. See U.C.C. § 2-106(1). Generally, courts have left this question for the fact-finder,
who must determine the intentions of the parties. See, e.g., Morgan v. Freel, 475 P.2d 641
(Colo. App. 1970); Lebowitz v. McPike, 151 Conn. 566, 201 A.2d 469 (1964); Meinhard-
Commercial Corp. v. Hargo Woolen Mills, 112 N.H. 500, 300 A.2d 321 (1973).
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value, it does not preclude judicial determination that the transac-
tion is an installment sale.7"
Using the analysis of such provisions under the UCC as an
analogue for characterizing rental purchase contracts, some provi-
sions of a rental purchase contract suggest that it is a lease, while
others indicate that it is a credit sale. An option to terminate how-
ever, does not by itself preclude characterization as a credit sale.
b. Underlying Facts. Courts should also consider facts underly-
ing the transaction. Most consumers enter into rental purchase
contracts primarily because they desire to own the leased prop-
erty.7 2  Indeed, retailers promote this desire in their advertise-
ments.7'  Another indication of intent that approximates a credit
sale is that a rental purchase contract's rental fee may exceed the
7 Courts have found terminable or open-end leases to be security interests under the
U.C.C. For example, in United Rental Equip. Co. v. Potts & Callahan Contracting Co., 231
Md. 552, 191 A.2d 570 (1963), the disputed lease required rental for a minimum period of
one month. At the end of the month, the lessee could renew by paying the same rental fee
per month until he chose to return the equipment to the lessor. The parties had agreed
that if the lessee elected to purchase, 85% of the rental fees would apply towards the
purchase price. The lessee argued that because the lease obligated the lessor for only a one
month term, the lessee did not have the right or option to-purchase the property. Reject-
ing this argument, the court held that "the parties contemplated the purchase of the
[property] by [the lessee] if he continued to pay the specified monthly rental and otherwise
complied with the lease." Id. at 559, 191 A.2d at 574. Considering a similar agreement, the
court in In re Royer's Bakery, Inc., I U.C.C. Rep. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1963), determined that the
lease was a security interest even though the lessee had the right to terminate without
further obligation by giving 30 days notice.
Some commentators, however, regard a lessee's right to terminate a lease agreement as
so significant that it should completely overshadow the existence of an option to purchase
for nominal or no additional consideration. See, e.g., Coogan, supra note 65, at 936-41.
Others view this interpretation as "somewhat extreme." Claxton, supra note 70, at 604
n.32.
72 See note 73 and accompanying text infra.
73 In Smith v. ABC Rental Sys. Inc., 491 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. La. 1978), Smith, the
lessee, claimed that he had entered into the lease agreement because of the rental purchase
plan, featured in the company's advertisements. He contended that the advertisements led
him to believe that he was purchasing, not renting, the lease-property, and that he was
obligated to make payments for 18 months. During the trial, Smith submitted copies of
ABC's television and radio advertisements, which stressed that consumers "need to know
before [they] buy," that they could "rent to own," and that all of the payments would be
credited towards purchasing the property. Id. at 128. The contract itself, however, which
Smith did not read, made no mention of the purchase plan. Id. The president of ABC
Rental testified that the company merely gave the rented item to a consumer who paid the
rental fees for 18 months. Id. The court, holding that the lease was not a credit sale,
observed that ABC's advertisement "was misleading in that it prominently featured the
rental purchase plan . I.." d. at 129.
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fair rental value chargeable under a conventional lease.7 ' Taken
together, these facts warrant a presumption that the parties in-
tend the rental to result in a sale. This presumption renders the
rental purchase contract presumptively a credit sale covered by
the Truth. In Lending Act.
IV
ELIMINATING THE EXCLUSION: APPLYING THE TRUTH IN
LENDING ACT TO RENTAL PURCHASE CONTRACTS
A. Regulation by the Federal Reserve Board
Congress granted the Federal Reserve Board authority to
prescribe regulations75 containing "such classifications, differenti-
ations, or other provisions ... necessary or proper ... to prevent
circumvention or evasion [of the Act]." 76 The Supreme Court has
observed that such broad authority indicates "the clear desire of
Congress to insure that the Board [has] adequate power to deal
with such attempted evasion ... no matter what adroit or un-
scrupulous practices [are] employed by those extending credit to
consumers." 77
Previous regulation by the Board establishes a precedent for
presumptively including an entire class of transactions within the
scope of the Act, even though certain transactions within the class
may not involve the actual extension of credit.78 The Board, for
example, has exercised its full regulatory power in promulgating
the Four Installment Rule, which requires credit cost disclosure
whenever a consumer is offered credit "which is payable by ag-
reement in more than four installments, or for which the payment
of a finance charge is or may be required."7 " The Supreme
Court has ruled the Four Installment Rule constitutional, holding:
In Johnson v. McNamara, No. H-78-498 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 1979), the lessee alleged
that she telephoned the lessor to inquire specifically about the rental-purchase of a stereo.
She claimed the rental purchase contract appealed to her because she could purchase the
set without a substantial down payment. She asserted that she intended at all times to
purchase the stereo, and stopped making the required weekly payments only when the
product was stolen from her residence. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Mo-
tion to Dismiss and in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability, Johnson
v. McNamara, No. H-78-498 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 1979).
7' For example, in Johnson v. McNamara, No. H-78-498 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 1979),
the lessee paid a fee of $14.97 per week under a rental purchase agreement. Two years
later, a different retailer offered a conventional lease at a cost of $14.95 per month. See
Hartford Courant, Feb. 25, 1979, at 3, 21.
7' See 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976); note 35 supra.
76 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
77 Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 365-66 (1973).
78 See, e.g., id. at 374.
79 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(s) (1980).
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[w]here ... the transactions or conduct which Congress seeks to
administer occur in myriad and changing forms, a requirement
that a line be drawn which insures that not one blameless indi-
vidual will be subject to the provisions of an act would un-
reasonably encumber effective administration and permit many
clear violators to escape regulation entirely. 0
Rental purchase contacts are among the "myriad forms" of trans-
actions that "escape" credit disclosure regulation under the Truth
In Lending Act.
The Federal Reserve Board should promulgate a regulation
that would establish an irrebuttable presumption that rental
purchase contracts are "credit sales" within the meaning of the
Act. Although the regulation would inevitably include some rental
purchase contracts that might otherwise be exempted as "true
leases," 81 the need for administrative convenience and the pre-
vention of blatant violations outweigh concerns about potential
overinclusiveness.
The Federal Reserve Board has maintained, however, that a
rental purchase contract terminable by the lessee is not a credit
sale,8 2 and has recommended that Congress amend the credit sale
definition to conform to the Board's administrative position.8 3
Consequently, it is unlikely that the Board will reverse its position
without a mandate from Congress.
B. Regulation by Judicial Interpretation
Courts interpreting the Truth In Lending Act generally give
great weight to the Federal Reserve Board's interpretations. Along
with Regulation Z,8 4 promulgated under the Act, such interpreta-
tions "constitute part of the body of 'informed experience and
judgment of the agency to whom Congress delegated appropriate
authority.' "85 Nevertheless, the paramount judicial duty is to in-
terpret statutes to effectuate legislative intent. Unofficial staff
opinion letters, accordingly, are not binding on the courts, and
they may consider independently whether a particular interpreta-
80 Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 374 (1973).
sI Courts have also had difficulty establishing a clear distinction between "credit sales"
and "true leases." See notes 68-74 and accompanying text supra.
81 See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
13 See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
'4 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.101-.1503 (1980).
85 Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F.2d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing
Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 372 (1973)).
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tion is consistent with the purposes of the Act.8 6 The legislative
history of section 160 2 (g) indicates that Congress intended the
Truth In Lending Act to govern leases that are actually disguised
credit sales. Courts, therefore, should examine arrangements on a
case by case basis to determine whether they constitute leases or
credit sales.
Reliance upon judicial initiative, however, is unsatisfactory.
The low sums of money commonly in dispute often do not justify
the expenses of litigation. The consumers most likely to use and
encounter problems with rental purchase contracts-those with
low income and limited education-are least likely to initiate legal
action. 87 When litigation does arise, the parties often will settle
the case before the court reaches a decision on the merits. 88 Case
by case resolution, moreover, may expose retailers to considerable
unexpected liability for failing to comply with the Act.8,
C. Congressional Action: Amending the "Credit Sale" Definition
The Truth In Lending Act does 'not currently insure that
rental purchase contracts will contain adequate credit cost disclo-
86 In Johnson v. McNamara, No. H-78-498, slip op. at 7 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 1979), the
court noted that "[ijn terms of persuasiveness, unofficial staff interpretations stand at the
bottom of the hierarchy of administrative rulings interpreting the federal Truth In Lend-
ing Act, behind both official staff interpretations and interpretations of the Federal Re-
serve Board itself. Unofficial staff interpretations ... are therefore not binding on this
court." See Grubb v. Oliver Enterprises, 358 F. Supp. 970, 973 n.6 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
87 See Rothstein, The Myth of Sis)phus: Legal Services Efforts on Behalf of the Poor, 7 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 493, 498-99 (1974). See generally Ventantonio, "Equal Justice Under the Law":
The Evolution of a National Commitment to Legal Services for the Poor and a Study of Its Impact on
New Jersey Landlord-Tenant Law, 7 SETON HALL L. REv. 233, 252-60 (1976).
'8 In Waldron v. Best T.V. & Stereo Rentals, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 718 (D. Md. 1979), for
example, the parties settled their dispute after the court denied the lessor's motion to
dismiss the case. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the lessee filed a motion to dismiss
the case with prejudice. The lessee's motion specified that the lessor "maintain[ed] that it
violated no federal or state laws, statutes, rules or regulations and, to the contrary, con-
tend[ed] that it ha[d] complied with all such requirements." Id. at 720. Under the settle-
ment agreement, the lessor agreed to pay the lessee $750 "in order to avoid the inconveni-
ence and expense of further litigation." Id.
85 Section 1640(f) of the Truth In Lending Act affords relief from liability to creditors
for
any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule, regulation,
or interpretation thereof by the Board or in conformity with any interpretation
or approval by an official or employee of the Federal Reserve System duly
authorized by the Board to issue such interpretations or approvals under such
procedures as the Board may prescribe therefor, notwithstanding that after
such act or omission has occurred, such rule, regulation, interpretation, or ap-
proval is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial ... authority to be
invalid for any reason.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(0 (1979).
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sure. Because a regulation insuring such disclosure is unlikely
under the current statute in light of the Federal Reserve Board's
position and judicial responses, Congress should amend the Act's
definition of "credit sale" to unambiguously cover rental purchase
contracts."0 The Senate approved legislation in 1979 that would
revise the definitions of "credit sale" and "creditor." 91 Despite the
Federal Reserve Board's recommendation, the revised definition
of "credit sale" does not address the issue of whether rental
purchase contracts are credit sales.9 2
Congress should incorporate an unambiguous definition of
"credit sale" that would specify a convenient method for deter-
mining if credit disclosures are required. : 3 It should specifically
include rental purchase contracts but be general enough to en-
0 Rental purchase contracts should be regulated as "credit sales" under the Truth In
Lending Act, rather than as "leases" under the Truth In Leasing Act, for several reasons.
First, the Truth In Leasing Act's requirement of a four-month lease term would exempt
most rental purchase contracts. See notes 35 & 38 supra. Second, regulatibn as a "lease"
might induce retailers to transform ordinary credit sales into rental purchase contracts to
avoid the strict disclosure requirements and penalties of the Truth In Lending Act. See text
accompanying note 22 supra. Most important, rental purchase contracts bear a closer re-
semblance to sales than to leases. See notes 65, 72-74, and accompanying text supra.
" See S. 108, 96th Cong.,.1st Sess. § 2 (1979), reprinted in 1979 TIL SIMPLIFICATION
HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 134-35. Section 2(b) of S. 108 would amend the definition of
"credit sale" so that "[t]he term ... refers to any sale in which the seller is a creditor." 1979
TIL SIMPLIFICATION HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 135. Section 2(a) of S. 108 would alter the
definition of "creditor" [15 U.S.C. § 1602(f)] by striking the first sentence of the definition
and inserting additional language:
The term "creditor" refers only to a person who both (1) regularly extends,
whether in connection with loans, sales of property or services, or otherwise,
consumer credit which is payable by agreement in more than four installments
or for which the payment of a finance charge is or may be required; and (2) is
the person to whom the debt arising from the consumer credit transaction is ini-
tially payable.... Notwithstanding the foregoing, a person who regularly arranges
for the extension of consumer credit, which is payable in more than four installments
or for which the payment of a finance charge is or may be required, from
persons who are not creditors is a creditor.
Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
The Senate intended this amendment to eliminate confusion under the current Act
regarding the responsibilities of assignees andI "arrangers of credit." See S. REP. No. 73,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1979). The National Consume'r Law Center argues that this
amendment "significantly reduces the scope of the Truth In Lending Act ... by narrowing
the key term 'creditor,'" and will "do away with the existing system of cooperative checks
and balances among multiple financers and arrangers substantially decreasing the accuracy
of disclosures and the likelihood of the cooperation among creditors necessary for com-
pliance by the business providing the disclosure statement." See 1979 TIL SIMPLIFICATION
HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 35.
112 See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
'13 The finance charge on a rental purchase contract could, for example, be determined
by comparing the cash retail price with the lease price, to establish a ratio for proration.
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compass other transactions similar, in purpose and effect. For
example, Congress might amend section 160 2 (g) to include lease
transactions and other similar arrangements in which the comple-
tion of a series of lease contracts results in the automatic transfer
of ownership to the lessee upon payment of rental fees substan-
tially equivalent to the value of the lease property.
9 4
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the Truth In Lending Act to eliminate de-
ceptive practices in the credit industry, promote consumer aware-
ness of credit costs, and facilitate comparison shopping for credit.
Retail merchants have circumvented the legislative controls by
structuring as leases transactions that are in substance "credit
sales." Nonregulation of rental purchase contracts is unfair to
consumers and inconsistent with Congress's intent in enacting
Truth In Lending disclosure provisions. The Federal Reserve
Board has declined to regulate rental purchase contracts, and the
courts, generally deferring to the Board's position, are reluctant
to solve the problem. Congress should amend the Truth In Lend-
ing Act's "credit sale" definition to explicitly encompass rental
purchase contracts and subject them to credit disclosure provi-
sions. Such legislation is necessary to further the goals and pur-
poses of credit disclosure regulation.
Karen F. Meenan
For example, Congress might adopt the following amendment to § 160 3 (g):
Sec. 2 Definitions
2(b) Subsection (g) of section 103 of the Truth In Lending Act is
amended to iead as follows:
(g)(1) The term "credit sale" means any sale in which the seller is a cre-
ditor.
(2) The following transactions are sales for the purchase of this subsection:
(i) any lease or series of leases which provide that the lessee may, at his
option, become owner of the lease-property for no more than a nominal fee,
upon payment of rental fees substantially equivalent to or greater than the
value of the lease property; and
(ii) any transaction or series of transactions with similar.purpose or ef-
fect.
(3) With respect to transactions described in subsection (2)(i) and (ii), the dis-
closures required by section 128 shall be calculted on the assumption that the
lessee will become owner of the lease property not before the last date
specified in the contract or series of contracts.
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APPENDIX
SAMPLE RENTAL PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS IS A RENTAL AGREEMENT ONLY
THE UNDERSIGNED. HEREIN CALLED "RENTER," WHETHER ONE OR MORE, DOES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLI
HEREBY RENT PROM THE RENTAL COMPANY, HEREIN CALLED "OWNER," THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PERSONAl
PROPERTY. HEREIN CALLED "PROPERTY," AT THE RENTAL RATES SET FORTH ABOVE, PAYABLE WEEKLY IN AD
VANCE FOR WEEK-TO-WEEK TERMS BEGINNING ON THE COMMENCEMENT DATE STATED ABOVE, EXCEPT A
STATED BELOW.
THIS IS A WEEK-TO-WEEK, DAY-TO-DAY, OR MONTH-TO-MONTH
RENTAL AGREEMENT ONLY
TITLE AND TERM: TITLE REMAINS AT ALL TIMES IN THE OWNER. THE RENTER RECEIVES USE AN
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY FOR SUCCESSIVE ONE-WEEK TERMS SO LONG AS WEEKLY RENTAL PAYMENTS AR]
MADE ON OR BEFORE THE DATE DUE AND RENTER COMPLIES FULLY WITH ALL AGREEMENTS AND CONDITION
HEREOF AND UNLESS THIS AGREEMENT IS TERMINATED AS PROVIDED HEREIN. IN THE EVENT RENTER FAILS T4
RENEW FOR A WEEK-TO-WEEK TERM BY PAYMENT OF THE WEEKLY RENTAL RATE IN ADVANCE ON OR BEFORE TH
DATE DUE AND RETAINS POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY, RENTER AGREES TO RENT SAID PROPERTY ON A DAY-TO-DA:
TERM AT THE OPTIONAL DAILY RENTAL RATES SET OUT ABOVE, PAYABLE IN ADVANCE. RENTER MAY ELECT T4
THEREAFTER RENEW ON A WEEK-TO-WEEK BASIS ON ANY WEEKLY ANNIVERSARY OF THE FIRST DUE DATE ABOVE B
MAKING ALL REQUIRED PAYMENTS TO SAID ANNIVERSARY DATE AND THE PAYMENT FOR A ONE WEEK TERM THERI
AFTER.
TERMINATION BY RENTER: RENTER, AT ITS OPTION, MAY AT ANY TIME TERMINATE THIS AGREEMENT B
RETURN OF THE PROPERTY TO OWNER IN ITS PRESENT CONDITION, FAIR WEAR AND TEAR EXCEPTED AND BY PAi
MENT OF ALL RENTAL PAYMENTS DUE THROUGH THE DATE OF RETURN.
TERMINATION BY OWNER: THIS AGREEMENT SHALL AT THE OPTION OF THE OWNER AND WITHOU
NOTICE TERMINATE UPON THE FAILURE OF RENTER TO MAKE EVERY RENTAL PAYMENT REQUIRED HEREIN ON 0
BEFORE THE DATE DUE, OR BY BREACH BY THE RENTER OF ANY AGREEMENT, CONDITION OR REPRESENTATION, AL
OF WHICH ARE AGREED TO BE MATERIAL, RENTER SHALL IMMEDIATELY RETURN THE PROPERTY TO OWNER IN I
PRESENT CONDITION, FAIR WEAR AND TEAR EXCEPTED, AND RENTER SHALL REMAIN LIABLE FOR ALL PAYMENI
HEREUNDER TO THE DATE OF TERMINATION AND FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL AGREEMENTS AND CONDITION
HEREOF.
LOCATION OF PROPERTY: RENTER WARRANTS AND AGREES THAT IT WILL KEEP SAID PROPERTY IN II
POSSESSION AT THE RESIDENCE ADDRESS ABOVE AND WILL NOT REMOVE SAID PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM SAI
ADDRESS WITHOUT AGREEMENT IN WRITING EXECUTED BY THE OWNER. IF RENTER MOVES SAID PROPERTY WITI
OUT SECURING PRIOR AGREEMENT IN WRITING FROM OWNER, THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE THEREBY BREACHEI
GIVING THE OWNER THE RIGHT OF IMMEDIATE POSSESSION AND RENTER SHALL BE LIABLE FOR PROSECUTIO
UNDER APPLICABLE STATE LAW.
INSURANCE: OWNER CARRIES NO INSURANCE ON THE ABOVE RENTAL PROPERTY.
DAMAGES: RENTER IS FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LOSS, THEFT OR DESTRUCTION OF SAID PROPERTY FRO
ALL CAUSES WHATEVER AND AGREES TO PAY TO THE OWNER THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN SUC
EVENT. IN THE EVENT OF DAMAGE AND/OR PARTIAL DESTRUCTION FROM ANY CAUSE WHATEVER, RENTER AGREE
TO PAY TO THE OWNER A REASONABLE COST OF REPAIR TO SAID PROPERTY.
ASSIGNMENT: THIS AGREEMENT MAY BE SOLD, TRANSFERRED AND ASSIGNED BY OWNER WITHOUT RESTRIi
TION. RENTER HAS NO RIGHT TO ASSIGN, SUB-LEASE OR TRANSFER HIS RIGHTS HEREIN WITHOUT THE WRITTE
CONSENT OF OWNER.
MAINTENANCE AND TAXES: THE OWNER DOES HEREBY AGREE TO MAINTAIN THE PERSONAL PROPERTY ]
GOOD WORKING ORDER AND ANY AND ALL MAINTENANCE OR REPAIRS TO THE PROPERTY OF THE OWNER RENTE
HEREUNDER MUST BE PERFORMED BY THE OWNER AND THE OWNER WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR COSTS OF A
REPAIRS DONE AT THE REQUEST OF THE RENTER BY OTHERS. THE OWNER SHALL PAY ANY PERSONAL PROPERI
TAXES ON SAID PROPERTY. MAINTENANCE IS NOT PROVIDED BEYOND THE DATE SPECIFIED ABOVE AS "MAINT
NANCE LIMIT."
OWNER'S RIGHT TO ENTER AND TAKE POSSESSION: THE OWNER AND ITS AGENTS, UPON THE TE
MINATION OF THIS AGREEMENT, ARE SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED TO ENTER UPON ANY PREMISES WHERE THE PRO
ERTY MAY BE FOUND AND TO TAKE POSSESSION OF AND REMOVE THE PROPERTY WITHOUT LIABILITY, AND OWNI
AND ITS AGENTS ARE HEREBY RELEASED AND DISCHARGED FROM ANY CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION IN OR RELATIb
TO ENTRY AND TAKING POSSESSION AND RENTER AGREES TO INDEMNIFY OWNER AND ITS AGENTS FOR ALL COSI
EXPENSES, AND DAMAGES OCCURRING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FROM OR RELATED TO THE TAKING POSSESSI(
AND THE REMOVAL OF SAID PROPERTY.
RENTER HAS NO RIGHT TO SELL, MORTGAGE, PAWN, PLEDGE, ENCUMBER, OR DISPOSE OF SAID PROPERTY OR I
MOVE SAID PROPERTY FROM THE RESIDENCE ADDRESS LISTED ABOVE. TO DO SO IS A BREACH OF THIS AGREEMEr
AND RENTER SHALL BE LIABLE UNDER APPLICABLE STATE LAW.
IN THE EVENT RENTER AT HIS SOLE ELECTION RENEWS THIS RENTAL AGREEMENT FOR U UCCESSIl
ONE-WEEK TERMS, OWNER WILL TRANSFER THE PROPERTY TO RENTER.
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE OF THIS AGREEMENT
NO ORAL STATEMENTS OR AGREEMENTS SHALL BE VALID OR BINDING ON THE PARTIES HERETO. THIS RE
TAL AGREEMENT MAY BE MODIFIED, VARIED, ALTERED OR EXTENDED, OR THE AGREEMENTS OR CONDITIO]
HEREOF WAIVED ONLY BY AGREEMENT IN WRITING EXECUTED BY THE OWNER. RENTER ACKNOWLEDGES P
CEIPT OF SAID PROPERTY IN SATISFACTORY OPERATING CONDITION. THE PROPERTY IS NOT REPRESENTED I
BE NEW PROPERTY.
I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE RENTAL AGREEMENT
